<p>One afternoon this summer, Catherine Olsson was relaxing with a friend in San Francisco's Mission Dolores Park when she had an idea, a little spontaneous flicker from pre-pandemic life. Why not grab dinner? She called in an order for two veggie burritos at a nearby taqueria.</p>
<p>今年夏天的一个下午，凯瑟琳·奥尔森(Catherine Olsson)和一位朋友在旧金山的多洛雷斯教会公园(Mission Dolores Park)休息。在疫情爆发前，她突发奇想。为什么不去吃晚饭呢?她打电话到附近的一家taqueria点了两份蔬菜卷饼。</p>
<p>Olsson popped over to the restaurant and, as she waited for her order number to be called, she looked around. She counted 10 workers standing along the open prep station assembling tacos and burritos behind a plexiglass barrier. Each worker wore a mask, but some wore them hanging off their chins or noses. Also, they were standing shoulder to shoulder. What were the odds that any of those workers had the virus that causes Covid-19, she wondered? The prevalence in San Francisco, she knew, was something like one in 300 people, but a recent antibody survey in this very neighborhood suggested frontline workers were about six times as likely to be infected as those who could stay home, which was awful to consider. And what about the five other customers shifting impatiently in the small enclosed space? At least their masks fit. She considered the steam rising from the beans and beef and wished she could crack a window and let in some air.</p>
<p>奥尔森匆匆来到了餐厅，在等待她的订单号时，她环顾了一下四周。她数了数，有10名工人站在一个有机玻璃屏障后面的开放式准备站旁，正在组装墨西哥煎玉米卷和墨西哥卷饼。每个工人都戴着口罩，但有些人把口罩挂在下巴或鼻子上。 而且，他们肩并肩站着。 她想知道，这些工人感染Covid-19病毒的几率有多大？旧金山的流行病感染率，她知道，大约是三百分之一，但最近在这个社区的抗体调查表明一线工人感染的可能性是那些可以呆在家里的人的六倍。这些数据令人难以置信。还有另外五名在狭小封闭的空间里不耐烦地移动的顾客呢?至少他们的面具合身。她想到豆子和牛肉里冒出来的蒸汽，真希望能打开一扇窗户，让空气进来。</p>
<p>Olsson was beginning to regret this adventure, which was unusual because her decisionmaking process is exquisitely calculated to avoid regret. Olsson thinks about risk for a living—she works for a Silicon Valley foundation on projects that seek to mitigate the potentially catastrophic effects of advanced AI—and is in the habit of assessing her daily life with data and models. A few years ago, after a close friend told her about a scare she'd had while cycling, Olsson decided to reevaluate her own bike commute. Was her life span more likely to be cut short by a fatal crash biking to work or by the increased chance of heart disease from sitting idly on the train? She was happier riding her bike than squeezing in with fellow passengers, but sometimes feelings need a fact check. She did the math and was pleased that it validated her choice to cycle.</p>
<p>奥尔森开始后悔这次冒险，很不同寻常，为了避免事后后悔，她的决定是经过深思熟虑的。奥尔森为生存而考虑风险——她在硅谷的一个基金会工作，做一些项目，旨在减轻先进人工智能潜在的灾难性影响——她习惯用数据和模型来评估自己的日常生活。几年前，一位亲密的朋友告诉奥尔森，她在骑自行车时曾感到害怕，之后她决定重新评估自己的自行车通勤方式。她的寿命是否更有可能因为骑自行车上班时发生致命的撞车事故而缩短，还是因为懒散地坐在火车上增加患心脏病的几率。她更喜欢骑自己的自行车，而不是挤在其他乘客中间，但有时感觉需要事实核查。她很高兴这证明了她选择骑车的正确性。</p>
<p>Olsson had begun applying this approach to living with the new coronavirus. The task was far more comprehensive. Unlike the risk of a bike accident, the risks posed by the virus radiated off of everything, turning the littlest things—a burrito!—into a gamble. At first, managing those risks was easy, if unpleasant. When the pandemic arrived in March, lockdowns constrained life and therefore made decisions simple. It was all of us together, in the interest of keeping hospitals from becoming overrun. But then, gradually, the world reopened, and life got more confusing. Perhaps tired, perhaps led astray by a government that wanted to believe the pandemic did not exist, much of the country fell into a collective delusion. If it was OK to play frisbee in the open air, then maybe sitting around inside, in a bar with those same frisbee-playing friends, wasn't so bad, either. Or maybe the virus wasn't that dangerous. Maybe it was even a hoax. So the number of daily cases kept rising: 150,000. 170,000. 200,000. As did the deaths.</p>
<p>奥尔森已经开始将这种方法应用于新型冠状病毒感染者的生活。这项任务要全面得多。与自行车事故的风险不同，病毒造成的风险会影响到一切，把最细小的事情——吃玉米煎饼——变成了一场赌博。起初，管理这些风险很容易，尽管它令人不快。当3月份疫情到来时，隔离限制了人们的生活，所以做决定很简单。为了防止医院人满为患，我们所有人团结在一起。但后来，世界逐渐重新开放，生活变得更加混乱。也许是厌倦了，也许是被一个想要相信大流行不存在的**引入歧途，这个国家的大部分人陷入了一种集体错觉。如果在户外玩飞盘是可以的，那么也许坐在里面，和那些玩飞盘的朋友在酒吧里，也不是那么糟糕。也许病毒并没有那么危险。也许这只是个骗局。因此，每天的病例确诊数持续上升:15万至17万至20万。死亡数也是这样。 </p>
<p>We have vaccines now, and an end is in sight. But even optimistic projections put us at least six months from widespread inoculation. In the meantime, the pandemic is as bad as ever, and people still need to make decisions about how to behave. Even the clearest advice—wear a mask, stay 6 feet apart, avoid indoor gatherings—doesn't address many of the subtle situations in which we find ourselves. Olsson's response was to calculate her way through our collective apathy and disillusionment, treating the virus not as an abstract and unknowable risk but one that could be measured and tamed until a vaccine eliminated it.</p>
<p>我们现在有了疫苗，末日即将来临;但即使是乐观的预测，我们也至少需要6个月时间才能大规模接种疫苗。与此同时，疫情仍像以往一样糟糕，人们仍需要就如何表现做出决定。即使是最明确的建议——戴上口罩、保持6英尺的距离、避免室内聚会——也没有解决我们发现自己身处的许多微妙环境。奥尔森的反应是，通过计算，克服我们集体的冷漠和幻灭，不把病毒视为抽象的、不可知的风险，而是一种可以衡量和驯服的风险，直到疫苗消除它。</p>
<p>Relentless tabulators often come off as zealous, maybe a little paranoid, and certainly no fun. Luckily, Olsson shares a house with fellow tabulators. She and her five housemates needed to find a way to live safely together. So they decided to adhere to a collective <a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://www.microcovid.org/">risk model</a> of their own design. Any model is only as good as the data that goes into it, and the virus was too new for anyone, even experts, to have perfect information. Olsson and her housemates knew this, but they weren't going to make the perfect the enemy of the good. They wanted to protect themselves, and by extension others, by making responsible choices. But they also wanted to be more free to actually live. Maybe math would make that possible.</p>
<p>无情的制表者往往表现出热情，可能有点偏执，这并不有趣。幸运的是，奥尔森和其他制表员合住一间房子。她和她的五个室友需要找到一种方法安全地生活在一起。所以他们决定坚持他们自己设计的集体风险模型。任何模型的好坏取决于它所包含的数据，而这种病毒对任何人，甚至是专家来说，都太新了，无法获得完整的信息。奥尔森和她的室友们知道这一点，但他们不会让完美成为好的敌人。他们想要通过负责任的选择来保护自己，进而保护他人。但他们也想更自由地生活。也许数学可以让这成为可能。 </p>
<p>That day at the taqueria, as the minutes ticked by and her risk tally rose, Olsson abandoned her burritos.</p>
<p>那天在taqueria餐厅，时间一分一秒地过去，她的风险也在增加，奥尔森放弃了她的墨西哥卷饼。</p>
<p>Olsson's friends call her Catherio, after the email address she was given while studying computational neuroscience at MIT. Two and a half years ago, at 28, she was living with her partner but missing the days when she could step out of her bedroom and instantly encounter a variety of other minds. It so happened that a friend from college, Stephanie Bachar, was in the process of “forking,” like incompatible software, from a communal living situation that no longer felt homey. So one June day, they and four friends decided to join forces and move into a beige, hacienda-style townhouse in San Francisco's Mission District. Their new home, they decided, would strike a better balance. It would be like a bash'—a type of chosen family described in Ada Palmer's science fiction novel <i>Too Like the Lightning</i> as a radical “haven for discourse.” They named it Ibasho, the Japanese word from which <i>bash'</i> is derived, which means “a place where you can feel like yourself.”</p>
<p>奥尔森在麻省理工学院(MIT)学习计算神经科学时得到了她的电子邮件地址，她的朋友们给她起了个名字叫凯瑟琳(Catherio)。两年半前，28岁的她和伴侣住在一起，但她怀念那些一走出卧室就能立刻接触到各种各样的人的日子。碰巧的是，我大学时的朋友斯蒂芬妮·巴卡尔(Stephanie Bachar)正在从一个不再有家的公共生活环境中“分叉”出来，就像不兼容的软件一样。于是，6月的一天，他们和四个朋友决定联手，搬进旧金山教会区(Mission District)的一座米色庄园式联排别墅。他们认为，他们的新家能更好地达到一种平衡。它就像一场狂欢”——艾达·帕尔默的科幻小说中也把这种选定的家庭描述为激进的“话语的避风港”——闪电。他们把它命名为伊巴索（Ibasho），这个日语单词是bash的词源，意思是“一个你可以感觉自己的地方”。</p>
<p>“Being yourself” in Ibasho meant being “slightly alternative, but professional,” says Rhys Lindmark, one of the residents. He had founded an online school for “world-class systems thinkers” after a stint researching blockchain ethics. The household was “high IQ, high EQ,” as Sarah Dobro, a primary care doctor who wears a septum ring and fauxhawk, describes it. Nerds, proudly, but socially aware nerds. They were well networked within a larger community of similar group houses around the Bay Area. It was like belonging to a more grown-up version of MIT dorms. Everyone seemed to know everyone from some salon or startup or quirky coding project. The social graph was dense.</p>
<p>在伊巴索，“做你自己”意味着“稍微有些另类，但很专业，”当地居民里斯·林德马克(Rhys Lindmark)说。在对区块链伦理学进行了一段时间的研究之后，他为“世界级的系统思考者”创办了一所在线学校。正如戴着隔圈戒指、戴着仿豪霍克假发的初级保健医生莎拉·多布罗(Sarah Dobro)所描述的那样，这家人是“高智商、高情商的”。这些书呆子们自豪但又有社会意识。他们与旧金山湾区附近的一个更大的社区有很好的联系。这里就像是属于一个更成熟的MIT宿舍。每个人似乎都认识沙龙、初创公司或古怪的编码项目中的每一个人。社交网是很密集的。</p>
<blockquote><p><i><strong>Read all of our coronavirus coverage </strong></i><a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://www.wired.com/tag/coronavirus/?itm_campaign=ArticleLinkTopBlockquote"><i><strong>here</strong></i></a><i><strong>.</strong></i></p>
<p><strong>点击这里阅读我们关于冠状病毒的所有报道。</strong><a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://www.wired.com/tag/coronavirus/?itm_campaign=ArticleLinkTopBlockquote"><strong>https://www.wired.com/tag/coronavirus/?itm_campaign=ArticleLinkTopBlockquote</strong></a></p>
</blockquote> <p>From the start, the friends had choreographed a sense of independent togetherness. They had a communal fridge and a private one. Everyone had a different diet: paleo, vegan, gluten-free, bread lover. Every two weeks they gathered for a house meeting around a big wood-slab table, made by one of Olsson's friends, in the room they called “the hearth.” They made decisions by consensus, following a detailed agenda with minutes and a time limit, lest the debate wear on too long. When things got a little raw—say, after two housemates moved Dobro's pottery and Olsson's trinkets from the fireplace mantel into a box and texted the two about the “clutter”—the group would move over to a big couch and bean bag chairs, where they could better speak with feelings, rather than logic.</p>
<p>从一开始，朋友们就精心制造了一种在一起但是又互相独立的分为。他们有一个公用冰箱和一个私人冰箱。每个人都有不同的饮食习惯:原始人，素食主义者，无麸质，面包爱好者。每两周，他们就在他们称之为“壁炉”的房间里，围绕着奥尔森的一位朋友制作的大木板桌举行一次家庭会议。他们通过协商一致的方式做出决定，遵循有会议记录和时间限制的详细议程，以免辩论持续太久。当事情变得有点粗难办糙的时候——比如，两个室友把多布罗的陶器和奥尔森（Olsson）的小饰品从壁炉架上搬到一个盒子里，并发短信告诉他们“杂乱”的情况——这群人就会搬到一个大沙发和豆袋椅上。他们可以用感觉说话，而不是逻辑。</p>
<p>Logic, however, usually ruled the day. The residents of the house were all, to varying degrees, adherents to rationalist modes of thinking and sought to reduce human biases in their day-to-day lives. As Olsson put it, the emotions they discussed on the couch provided important data, but they would return to the table to make any final decisions.</p>
<p>然而，逻辑通常占上风。 房子里的居民在不同程度上都是理性主义思维模式的追随者，并试图在日常生活中减少人类的偏见。正如奥尔森所言，他们在沙发上讨论的情绪提供了重要的数据，但他们会回到谈判桌前做出任何最终决定。</p>
<p>Residents of Ibasho at "the hearth": Catherine Olsson, Josh Oreman, and Sarah Dobro.</p>
<p>“壁炉”伊巴索的居民:凯瑟琳·奥尔森（Catherine Olsson）、乔什·奥尔曼（Josh Oreman）和莎拉·多布罗（Sarah Dobro）。</p>
<p>Photograph: Gabriela Hasbun</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）</p>
<p>They were certainly people who could easily grasp the implications of exponential growth. So last winter, as the novel coronavirus hit far-off places, the residents of Ibasho girded themselves. In late February, at their biweekly Tuesday night open house called Macwac (milk and cookies/wine and cheese), visitors cycled through a sanitizing station by the front door, and Olsson's party trick was a roving demonstration of proper handwashing technique, using ultraviolet gel. After that, Ibasho hunkered down. The following week, so did the rest of San Francisco.</p>
<p>他们当然是能够很容易地理解指数增长含义的人。因此，去年冬天，当新型冠状病毒袭击偏远地区时，伊巴修的居民做好了准备。 2月底，在他们每两周举办一次的“Macwac”(牛奶和饼干/葡萄酒和奶酪)开放日活动上，游客们轮流经过前门旁的一个消毒站，奥尔森的派对小把戏是用紫外线凝胶巡回演示正确的洗手技巧。 在那之后，伊巴修蹲了下来。接下来的一个星期，旧金山的其他地方也一样。</p>
<p>Living was simple at first. The government had ordered everyone to stay home, so the housemates stayed home. Macwac made a brief online appearance on experimental software that took the form of a virtual living room, where people could gather in separate corners to chat. (“It was sufficiently weird and depressing that we never did it again,” Dobro says.)</p>
<p>起初生活很简单。**命令所有人都呆在家里，所以室友们都呆在家里。Macwac在一个虚拟客厅的实验软件上做了一个简短的在线展示，人们可以在不同的角落聚集在一起聊天。（多布罗（Dobro）说:“我们再也没有这么做了，这真是够奇怪和令人沮丧的。”)</p>
<p>Then the world started to open back up. This was accompanied by the reemergence of a thing called “desire.” In its wake came strain. Olsson describes what happened next as the “everyone-needing-exceptions problem.” The underlying issue was that any one person's desires affected everyone else in the household. That wasn't an unfamiliar concept. A similar principle applied to the matter of the ceramics, and they had resolved that by compromising on the number and prominence of the pots. But the prospect of one person's actions exposing the others to the virus was more harrowing, and the questions were more intimate, more fundamental to their happiness. Questions, primarily, of love. Could Rhys kiss that girl? The committee would hear the matter next week. Polyamorous relationships made for dilemmas: Could Dobro's partner's spouse's partner go on a bike ride with a friend? The answer was yes. What about visits to Mom? Well, they couldn't veto that, they thought—unless maybe, actually, they could.</p>
<p>然后随着居家隔离逐渐解除。随之而来的是一种叫做“欲望”的东西的重新出现。同时还有紧张。奥尔森将接下来发生的事情描述为“每个人都需要例外的问题”。根本的问题是，任何一个人的欲望都会影响到家里的其他人。这不是一个陌生的概念。类似的原理也适用于陶器，他们通过在陶器的数量和突出程度上妥协来解决这个问题。但是一个人的行为让其他人暴露在病毒下的前景更令人痛心，这些问题更亲密，对他们的幸福更重要。主要是关于爱情的问题。里斯能吻那个女孩吗？委员会将于下周审理此事。多角恋关系让人进退两难:多布罗伴侣的配偶的伴侣可以和朋友一起骑自行车吗?答案是肯定的。那去探望妈妈呢?好吧，他们不能否决，他们认为——除非可能，实际上，他们可以。</p>
<p>A breaking point came during the Black Lives Matter protests in late spring. Could a few of them join? The pod convened an emergency meeting and decided that waving signs from a distance of 30 feet with a mask was fine, but if anyone entered the crowd, they would have to wear a mask around the house for 11 days to reduce the risk to the others. “Some people thought we were discouraging civic participation,” Olsson says. But as she saw it, they were issuing cautious public health guidance to their pod based on the little data they had.</p>
<p>在春末的“黑人的命也是命”(Black Lives Matter)的活动中，一个转折点出现了。他们中的一些人能加入到这项活动中吗?救生舱召开了一次紧急会议，会议决定带着口罩在30英尺外挥舞标语是可以的，但如果有人进入人群，他们必须带着口罩在房子外面呆11天，以减少对其他人的风险。“有些人认为我们在阻碍公民参与，”奥尔森说。但在她看来，他们是在自己掌握的少量数据的基础上，谨慎发布的公共卫生指南。</p>
<p>Catherine Olsson thinks about risk for a living and suggested a mathematical model for managing Covid-19 living in her group house.</p>
<p>凯瑟琳·奥尔森(Catherine Olsson)为生存考虑了风险，并提出了一个管理新冠病毒的数学模型。</p>
<p>Photograph: Gabriela Hasbun</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）</p>
<p>The meetings were growing tiresome, the decisions more contentious. “We were watching group houses fall apart around us,” Dobro says. What was the point of living as a chosen family in your thirties if doing so meant doing less? “At some point, they're just like, ‘I can't.'”</p>
<p>会议越来越令人厌倦，决定也越来越有争议。多布罗说:“我们看着我们周围的集体住房慢慢崩塌。”如果在你30多岁的时候，作为一个被选中的家庭，这样做就意味着要少做些什么，那你的生活意义何在? “在某些时候，他们会觉得，‘我做不到。’”</p>
<p>It was a minor universe to be concerned with in a moment of global sickness and death. But then again, for most of us, our own small daily choices are all we have. To be free is to pursue your own choices. But freedom also means being responsible to the wider community; it is freeing to know that the people around you are not a threat to your health and well-being, and that you are not a harm to them. As the housemates tried to decide on the correct amount of freedom, they were in agreement that they could not rely on the government to delineate it. After all, in some places, indoor dining opened before playgrounds, and basic guidance about masks and disinfection had been bungled. And governments did not seem interested in questions of love and friendship. Olsson had started tweeting at San Francisco mayor London Breed. <i>Where was the data to justify reopening this and not that? What was the city's guidance on hugging a friend?</i> If Ibasho was going to survive the pandemic intact, its members would have to figure out a better way to evaluate risk. They couldn't convene the house parliament every time Rhys wanted to kiss a girl.</p>
<p>在全球疾病和死亡面前，我们所关心的眼前的空间是微不足道的。但话又说回来，对我们大多数人来说，我们每天的小小选择是我们所拥有的一切。自由就是追求自己的选择。但是自由也意味着对更广泛的社会负责;知道你周围的人不会威胁到你的健康和幸福，你也不会对他们造成伤害是一种解脱。当室友们试图决定自由的正确额度时，他们一致认为不能依赖**来划分自由。毕竟，在一些地方，室内餐厅的开放先于操场，有关口罩和消毒的基本指导也被搞砸了。**似乎对爱情和友谊的问题不感兴趣。奥尔森开始给旧金山市长布里德（London Breed）发推文。有什么数据证明重新开放这个而不是那个?城市对拥抱朋友的指导建议是什么?如果伊巴索要在疫情中存活下来，它的成员就必须想出更好的方法来评估风险。他们不能在每次里斯想吻一个女孩的时候都要召集议会。</p>
<p>In the late 1970s, a Stanford engineering professor named Ronald Howard became preoccupied with the risks of life. Every activity, he wrote in a <a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a081424.pdf">research brief</a> for the US military in 1979, involves hazards:</p>
<p>20世纪70年代末，斯坦福大学一位名叫罗纳德·霍华德(Ronald Howard)的工程学教授开始专注于生命中的风险。他在1979年给美国军方的一份研究简报中写道，每一项活动都有危险:</p>
<ul><li>Walking: dog attacks, motor vehicles, falling</li><li>Horseback riding: falling, being kicked, struck by branches</li><li>Staying in bed: fires, burglars, falling airplanes, meteorites, earthquakes</li></ul>
<ul><li>走路:被狗咬，被车撞，跌倒 </li><li>骑马:摔倒，被踢，被树枝打到</li><li>躺在床上:火灾、窃贼、坠落的飞机、陨石、地震</li></ul>
<p>Even the least consequential risks could be quantified with enough data, but often they were so small that they were hard to grasp. So Howard proposed a subunit that he called a micromort: a one-in-a-million chance of death. The advantage of this measure was that it could be used to compare the dangers of apparently dissimilar activities. The risk of a scuba dive, 5 micromorts, could be shown as roughly equivalent to the risk of driving a car from New York City to Cincinnati and back. In this way, Olsson might evaluate the risks of her bicycle commute versus a train ride, or a person might ease the dread of an upcoming surgery by comparing it to something they like to do, like downhill skiing. Howard's belief was that we willingly invite the possibility of death all the time in order to live our lives more fully. So why not optimize the benefits we get out of this gamble?</p>
<p>即使是影响最小的风险也可以用足够的数据进行量化，但这些风险往往很小，难以把握。因此，霍华德提出了一种他称之为微虫的亚单位:百万分之一的死亡几率。这项措施的优点是可以用来比较明显不同的活动的危险。一个5微莫特的水肺潜水的风险大致相当于开车从纽约到辛辛那提来回的风险。通过这种方式，奥尔森可能会评估骑自行车上下班和坐火车上下班的风险，或者一个人可能会通过比较他们喜欢做的事情(比如下坡滑雪)来缓解对即将到来的手术的恐惧。霍华德的信念是为了让我们活得更充实，我们应该愿意接受死亡的可能性。那么，为什么不优化我们从这场赌博中得到的收益呢?</p>
<p>Howard's work was part of a wave of research interested in righting human wrongness. Previous orthodoxy had held that human decisionmaking—whether in the stock market or war—could be described by rational models. So why do humans sometimes make decisions that don't bring them maximal benefit? Psychologists like Daniel Kahneman proposed that the mind takes shortcuts—heuristics, he called them—which are beset by biases. It's perfectly human, for example, to fear a plane crash more than a car crash—plane crashes are out of your control and kill many people at once. But a car crash is more likely to kill you, mile for mile. Sometimes these shortcuts lead us straight to perfectly good outcomes. Often they do not. Even giving people clear evidence that they are acting against their own interest doesn't help them change course. The biases seem to be hardwired in our brains.</p>
<p>霍华德的工作是一系列纠正人类错误的研究中的一部分。以前的正统观点认为，人类的决策——无论是在股市还是在战争中——都可以用理性模型来描述。那么，为什么人类有时会做出不能给自己带来最大利益的决定呢?像丹尼尔·卡尼曼（Daniel Kahneman）这样的心理学家提出，大脑会走捷径——他称之为“启发式”——这些捷径受到偏见的困扰。例如，害怕飞机失事比害怕汽车失事更合乎人性——飞机失事是不受你控制的，会同时杀死很多人。但随着车子越开越远，车祸更有可能让你丧命。有时这些捷径会直接把我们引向完美的结果。但是通常他们不会。即使给人们明确的证据证明他们的行为违背了自己的利益，也不能帮助他们改变方向。这种偏见似乎在我们的大脑中根深蒂固。</p>
<p><a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-guide-faq-advice">Everything You Need to Know About the Coronavirus</a></p>
<p><a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-guide-faq-advice">你需要知道的关于新冠病毒的一切</a></p>
<p>Here's all the WIRED coverage in one place, from how to keep your children entertained to how this outbreak is affecting the economy. </p>
<p>所有的连线报道都聚焦在这里，问题的内容涵盖从如何让你的孩子娱乐到疫情如何影响经济。</p>
<p>Howard's answer to such irrationality was “installing a new operating system on your brain,” as he wrote. He had first started thinking about the complexities of decisionmaking in the 1960s, when he was called in from academia to help General Electric ponder installing a new component on its nuclear reactors—a question that involved minute uncertainties as well as dire risks and great expenses. The process took eight months. His method, which he called decision analysis, involved reducing a decision to a series of inputs: probabilities in place of uncertainties, using the best possible data to properly weigh each cost and benefit. Essentially, he wanted to clear away the biases and red herrings and get to what actually mattered to the final outcome. It was an iterative process, designed to consider the range of all possible outcomes and inputs. It didn't erase the risk of a nuclear meltdown. But if one happened, the company could look back and know that it had made a sound decision.</p>
<p>霍华德对这种非理性的回答是“在你的大脑里安装一个新的操作系统”，正如他所写的。他第一次开始思考决策的复杂性是在20世纪60年代，当时他被学术界请去帮助通用电气考虑在其核反应堆上安装一种新的组件——这个问题涉及到微小的不确定性，以及可怕的风险和巨大的费用。这个过程耗时8个月。他的方法被他称为“决策分析”(decision analysis)，包括将决策简化为一系列输入:用概率代替不确定性，使用尽可能好的数据来恰当权衡每一项成本和收益。从本质上讲，他想要消除偏见和转移注意力的因素，得出对最终结果真正重要的东西。这是一个迭代过程，旨在考虑所有可能的结果和输入的范围。但这并没有消除核反应堆熔毁的风险。但如果发生了这样的事情，该公司回头看看，就会知道自己做出了一个明智的决定。</p>
<p>Ibasho had engaged in a similar process each time the residents sat down to discuss exceptions. But since this was becoming agonizing to do over and over again for each little thing, Olsson wondered if they could find a way to agree on the costs of everything in a more systematic fashion. That way, they could budget their risk until there was a vaccine. It would be a little like counting calories. Like consuming a sliver of chocolate cake, it was easy to rationalize a single risky decision. Soon enough you'll consume the whole thing. But if you have to record that sliver and put its calories on display, you'll think about each bite. The decision about how to spend your budget would be yours—not chosen by the committee—but it would require weighing today's indulgence against any future snacks.</p>
<p>每次居民们坐下来讨论例外情况时，伊巴索都会进行类似的过程。但是，由于对每一件小事都要一遍又一遍地做这件事，这变得非常痛苦，奥尔森想知道，他们是否能找到一种方法，以一种更系统的方式就每件事情的成本达成一致。这样，他们就可以在找到疫苗之前对风险进行预算。这有点像计算卡路里。就像吃一小块巧克力蛋糕一样，很容易为一个冒险的决定找借口。很快你就会把所有东西都吃光。但如果你必须记录下每一口食物的卡路里含量，你就会考虑每一口。如何使用你的预算是你的决定——不是委员会选择的——但它需要权衡今天的放纵和未来的零食。</p>
<p>When she proposed this idea, a few of her housemates thought it sounded wonderful. They also happened to be the ones asking for the most exceptions. They had romantic partners living outside the house or they were looking for someone new. Or else, like Olsson, they were numerical enthusiasts. But to Bachar, the housemate Olsson knew from college, it sounded overwhelming. “Thinking about Covid on a daily basis freaked me out,” she says. As the world opened up again, she had chosen to live with minimal exceptions. She wanted life to be settled and safe, not optimized. More data wasn't going to make her life any easier. It was going to make her crazy. So she and her like-minded fiancé, Nick Breen, asked to be excused from the virus talk. This wasn't normal house procedure, but the others agreed that they would keep Bachar and her partner looped in. Then, when it was ready, they would all stick to the budget.</p>
<p>当她提出这个想法时，她的一些室友认为这听起来很棒。他们也恰好是要求例外最多的人。他们有恋人住在房子外面或者他们正在寻找新的伴侣。或者，像奥尔森一样，他们是数字爱好者。但对于奥尔森在大学时认识的室友巴卡尔来说，这听起来令人难以抗拒。她说:“每天一想到新冠病毒，我就害怕。”随着世界重新开放，她选择了极少例外的生活方式。她想要安定、安全的生活，而不是完美的生活。再多的数据也无济于事。那会让她发疯的。于是，她和她志同道合的未婚夫尼克·布林(Nick Breen)请求不参与有关病毒的谈话。这不是正常的家庭程序，但其他人同意他们会让巴卡尔和她的搭档参与进来。然后，当一切都准备好了，他们都会遵守预算。</p>
<p>“Thinking about Covid on a daily basis freaked me out,” says Stephanie Bacher. With her fiancé, Nick Breen, they agreed to follow the Microcovid budget, but not get involved in its design.</p>
<p>“每天想到新冠病毒就会把我吓坏，”Stephanie Bacher说。她和她的未婚夫尼克·布林(Nick Breen)同意跟踪微型病毒的预算，但不参与设计。</p>
<p>Photograph: Gabriela Hasbun</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）</p>
<p>Beginning in May, the four members of Ibasho's new Covid subcommittee began to develop a system for weighing and budgeting viral risk. Olsson called their risk points microcovids, in a tip of the hat to Howard, and one microcovid equaled a one-in-a-million chance of catching the virus. They pulled epidemiology papers from Google Scholar and gathered around the table in the hearth to go through the data. The first step was to impose a top-line risk budget that would anchor all of their calculations. They debated this question at length. Olsson floated the idea of 10,000 microcovids per person per year—the equivalent of a 1 percent chance of catching Covid. But what was the actual cost of 10,000 microcovids? By their estimations, for people their age, a 1 percent chance of getting sick was about as risky as driving, which was something they did without thinking. And besides, they figured, if other people who could stay home kept to a similar budget, the hospitals would not overflow. The virus might even disappear.</p>
<p>从5月开始，伊巴索新设的新冠病毒小组委员会的四名成员开始开发一个衡量病毒风险和编制预算的系统。奥尔森称他们的风险点为微冠状病毒(microcovid)，向霍华德致敬，一个微冠状病毒相当于百万分之一的机会感染病毒。他们从谷歌学者那里拿了一些流行病学的论文，聚在火炉边的桌子旁仔细研究数据。第一步是强加一个顶线风险预算，以固定他们所有的计算。他们详细地讨论了这个问题。奥尔森提出了每人每年感染1万例微冠状病毒的想法，这相当于感染新冠病毒的几率为1%。但1万枚微型病毒的实际成本是多少?根据他们的估计，对于他们这个年龄的人来说，1%的患病几率和开车的风险差不多，而开车的时候他们是不加思考的。此外，他们还认为，如果其他可以呆在家里的人也有类似的预算，医院就不会人满为患。病毒甚至可能消失。</p>
<p>It was clear from the start that the evidence they were looking for did not exist. Unlike the risk of dying in a scuba accident, it was not well understood how people exposed to the virus in specific situations actually catch Covid-19. You couldn't attach a number to the risk of visiting a grocery store or taking the bus. “The data is not designed for people doing math to make their lives better,” Olsson says.</p>
<p>很明显，从一开始他们所寻找的证据就不存在。与在水肺事故中死亡的风险不同，人们并不清楚在特定情况下接触到病毒的人是如何感染新冠的。你不能给去杂货店或乘公共汽车的风险打上号码。奥尔森说:“这些数据不是为了让人们通过做数学来改善生活而设计的。”</p>
<p>But there was another way to approach the exercise. Any situation could be broken down into two parts: the risk that the people around you were infected and the risk that any infected person would give you the virus. There might not be data on the spread of the virus inside a particular restaurant, or even restaurants generally, but you could attempt to calculate the risk of being in a room with, say, 10 masked workers and 20 unmasked diners for one hour. And then you could tweak the calculation depending on whether there was ventilation or loud talking or the tables were distanced 12 feet apart. Such a model would be a Frankenstein's monster hodge-podge of estimations. But it would be a place to start comparing one disparate situation to another.</p>
<p>但是还有另一种方法来进行练习。任何情况都可以分为两部分:你周围的人被感染的风险和被感染的人将病毒传染给你的风险。可能没有关于病毒在特定餐馆，甚至一般餐馆内传播的数据，但你可以尝试计算与10名戴口罩的工作人员和20名不戴口罩的用餐者共处一小时的风险。然后你可以根据是否有通风或者大声说话或者桌子之间有12英尺的距离来调整计算。这样的模型将是一种弗兰肯斯坦式恐怖的估算。但可以从这里开始比较不同的情况。</p>
<p>So, first, the risk of the people. One metric that Ibasho could determine with some accuracy was the local prevalence of the virus—a function of the number of cases reported and the rate of positive Covid-19 tests.</p>
<p>所以，首先，人们的风险。通过报告病例数和新冠病毒检测阳性率的函数，伊巴索可以比较准确地确定的一个指标是该病毒在当地的流行程度。</p>
<p>The second part was trickier: the likelihood of an infected person spreading the virus to you. At first, like everyone, the residents of Ibasho had freaked out about contaminated surfaces; hence the sanitizing at Macwac. But then experts they trusted began to believe that the virus was spread in the air. As they scoured the rapidly expanding canon of Covid resear</p> <p>ch, they found the factors that made a situation more or less risky came down to mask quality, ventilation, distance from other people, and—a particular surprise to them—the volume at which people spoke, because loud talking meant spewing more virus. The complication was determining how much weight to give each factor.</p>
<p>第二部分比较棘手:被感染者将病毒传染给你的可能性。一开始，和所有人一样，伊松岛的居民对污染的表面感到恐慌;因此在Macwac进行了消毒。但随后他们信任的专家开始相信病毒是通过空气传播的。他们在迅速扩大的新冠病毒研究领域进行搜索。他们发现，导致情况风险增加或减少的因素包括口罩质量、通风、与他人的距离，以及让他们特别惊讶的是人们说话的音量，因为大声说话意味着吐出更多的病毒。并发症决定了每个因素的权重。</p>
<p>One of the researchers Olsson followed on Twitter was Jose-Luis Jimenez, an aerosol scientist at the University of Colorado Boulder who had made an attempt at <a rel="nofollow noopener" href="https://docsgoogle.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/16K1OQkLD4BjgBdO8ePj6ytf-RpPMlJ6aXFg3PrIQBbQ/edit#gid=519189277%E2%80%9D">modeling</a> the rate of transmission between people within a closed space for a given duration of time. His calculations took into account humidity and airflow and breathing rates, and he sourced them from dozens of papers on masks and ventilation. But much of the evidence had been gathered in studies of flu and other viruses, not the new coronavirus, and the true rate of spread would depend largely on the specifics of any given space. “We don't know this disease very well,” Jimenez says. Still, the Ibasho residents raided the cupboard, supplementing his sources with other studies they found.</p>
<p>奥尔森在推特上关注的研究人员之一是科罗拉多大学博尔德分校的气溶胶科学家何塞-路易斯·希门尼斯(Jose-Luis Jimenez)，他曾试图模拟给定时间内封闭空间内人与人之间的传播速度。他的计算考虑了湿度、气流和呼吸频率，这些数据来自几十篇有关口罩和通风的论文。但大部分证据是在对流感和其他病毒的研究中收集的，而不是在对新型冠状病毒的研究中，而且真正的传播速度将在很大程度上取决于任何给定空间的细节。“我们对这种疾病还不是很了解，”希门尼斯说。尽管如此，伊松岛的居民还是搜查了这个柜子，用他们发现的其他研究来补充他的资料。</p>
<p>There were also special situations to consider. They added in the risks of housemates and partners based on contact-tracing studies that estimated how likely the virus spread within homes and at work. If new data on airplane filtration or infection rates from indoor dining became available, they would revisit the evidence and update accordingly. They would never be exact, Olsson knew. Every data point they had was uncertain, and the evidence for everything from masks to ventilation was under intense public litigation. The numbers they came up with were not any an epidemiologist or government entity would endorse. But as they checked their intuitions, the numbers were starting to <i>feel</i> right.</p>
<p>还有一些特殊情况需要考虑。他们在接触追踪研究的基础上增加了室友和伴侣的风险，该研究估计了病毒在家庭和工作场所传播的可能性。如果有关于飞机过滤或室内用餐感染率的新数据，他们将重新研究相关证据并进行相应更新。奥尔森知道，它们永远不会是精确的。他们掌握的每一个数据点都不确定，从口罩到通风设备，所有证据都处于激烈的公众诉讼之中。他们得出的数字不是任何流行病学家或**机构会认可的。但当他们的直觉告诉他们，这些数字的正确率在上升。</p>
<p>For Olsson, estimating risk points was like tying her shoes or putting on a jacket before stepping outside.</p>
<p>对奥尔森来说，估计风险点就像出门前系鞋带或穿上夹克一样。</p>
<p>Photograph by Gabriela Hasbun; Video by Elena Lacey</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）；****：埃琳娜•莱茜（Elena Lacey）</p>
<p>In July, after a few weeks of testing and demos with the more apprehensive housemates, the house met and agreed that the Microcovid system was ready for use. The risk assessment tool was really just a Google spreadsheet. Each person had a tab, and they established protocols. The Microcovid creators had allocated each house member 10,000 points for the year, but they had only 3,000 points to spend. Because they lived in a house of six people plus two quasi-live-in partners, just being at home would cost them each about two-thirds of their points. Ideally, before stepping out the door, they would hop on their laptops and enter estimations for things like the number of people, the quality of the ventilation, and the rate of mask-wearing for whatever activity they planned to do. The calculator would spit out a number of points based on these factors, and they would enter it in the sheet—they could update the numbers later, if reality turned out to be different.</p>
<p>今年7月，在经过几周的测试和与更焦虑的室友演示后，众议院召开会议，同意微型新冠病毒系统已准备好投入使用。风险评估工具实际上只是一个谷歌电子表格。每个人都有自己的账单，他们制定了协议。微型新冠的创造者为每个众议院成员分配了1万个积分，但他们只有3000个积分可以消费。因为他们住在一个六人的房子里，外加两个准同居伴侣，仅仅是待在家里就会让他们每人损失三分之二的分数。理想情况下，在走出家门之前，他们会打开笔记本电脑，输入诸如人数、通风质量以及他们计划从事的任何活动戴口罩的频率等评估数据。计算器会根据这些因素给出一些分数，他们会把这些分数输入表格——如果现实情况有所不同，他们可以稍后更新这些数字。</p>
<p>The first thing Olsson noticed as she stepped into a new world of calculated freedom was that certain things mattered more than she had believed. By summer, going to the grocery store had started to feel normal again. But it involved spending time indoors with lots of people, some of whom inevitably wore ill-fitting masks, and it was eating up their points. The solution: communal shopping for the house with P100 masks, the kind you wear when using paint thinner, with the valve covered by a surgical mask. “It's a strange fashion choice in Berkeley Bowl,” Olsson says, “but it's good to know the PPE has got your back.”</p>
<p>当奥尔森步入一个经过计算的自由新世界时，她注意到的第一件事是，有些事情比她想象的更重要。到了夏天，去杂货店的感觉又开始变得正常起来。但这需要和很多人呆在室内，其中一些人不可避免地戴着不合身的面具，这正在吞噬他们的积分。解决方案:集体购买带有P100口罩的房子，就是你使用油漆稀释剂时戴的那种，用外科口罩覆盖阀门。“这在伯克利碗是一个奇怪的时尚选择，”奥尔森说，“但是获得PPE的支持还是很高兴。”</p>
<p>For Olsson, the point estimation was more like tying her shoes or putting on a jacket before stepping outside. “I don't find it overwhelming at all,” she says. She could meet up with a friend outdoors, and the combination of fresh air, masks, and distance would whittle the interaction down to just a few points—a blip in the budget. Dobro could take a Lyft to her office downtown and it wasn't such a big deal, the calculations suggested—provided both she and the driver wore masks and kept the windows open.</p>
<p>对奥尔森来说，她的预估更像是在出门之前系好鞋带或穿上夹克。她说:“我一点也不觉得这让人受不了。”她可以和朋友在户外见面，新鲜空气、口罩和距离的结合会让互动减少到只有几个点——预算上的一个小点。计算表明，多布罗可以叫来福车去她在市中心的办公室，这并不是什么大事——前提是她和司机都戴着口罩，并把车窗开着。</p>
<p>Though the budget was set for a year, the housemates apportioned the points weekly, so that one person wouldn't hoard their points and blow them on a 150-person unmasked indoor wedding. Sometimes the constraint produced challenges: A rare high-risk event, like a flight, might exceed an individual person's budget. This was OK once in a while, provided the person wore a mask around the house and then got a Covid test.</p>
<p>虽然预算是一年的，但室友们每周分配一次，这样就不会有一个人囤积积分，然后把它们挥霍在150人的室内婚礼上。有时约束会产生挑战:罕见的高风险事件，比如飞行，可能会超出个人的预算。偶尔这样做是可以的，前提是这个人在房子周围戴上口罩，然后进行新冠病毒检测。</p>
<p>Some activities were trickier to translate into points. First dates, in particular, would trigger a reversion to what Olsson calls a “one-off person-risk estimate.” The fact-finding missions these estimates required were a little strange and intrusive. The housemates wanted to know how often a new person shopped for groceries, who they lived with. Were they a gym rat? An ER doctor? Bachar found these interrogations uncomfortable. It felt as if she was implying that her friends were behaving badly. But others felt the questions were a reasonable concession to the pandemic. Dobro says that polyamory had prepared her for these awkward conversations around trade-offs. “We're used to having conversations that are linked to risk,” she says. If you choose to be indoors with someone, the roommates agreed, make it count. Make it a deep conversation. Make it sex.</p>
<p>有些活动更难转化为点数。特别是第一次约会，会导致人们回归到奥尔森所说的“一次性个人风险评估”。“这些估算所需的事实调查任务有点奇怪也很容易被其他事情干扰。室友们想知道新来的人多久买一次杂货，他们和谁住在一起。他们是健身迷吗?一个急诊室医生吗?巴卡尔觉得这些审问很不舒服。她似乎在暗示她的朋友们行为不端。但其他人认为，这些问题是对疫情的合理让步。多布罗说，一夫多妻制让她为这些关于权衡的尴尬对话做好了准备。“我们习惯于与风险相关的谈话，”她说。“如果你选择和某人呆在室内，”室友们同意，那就算数。那就让对话更深入。</p>
<p>Microcovid told Sarah Dobro that she could take a Lyft to work with masks and open windows and it wouldn't be a big deal.</p>
<p>微新冠告诉莎拉·多布罗，她可以带上口罩，开着来福t来上班，这不会有什么大不了的。</p>
<p>Photograph by Gabriela Hasbun; Video by Elena Lacey</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）；****：埃琳娜•莱茜（Elena Lacey）</p>
<p>What if society had a budget for risk? In some ways, it does. This was the initial premise of shutdowns and social distancing and sheltering in place. Our common infection budget was tied to hospital capacity—the number of ICU beds and respirators and medical staff able to respond. For those who could work from home, the task was to contribute as little as possible to the overall sum. This left more points for those who couldn't. Then, as the first infection curve began to flatten, the foundation of the societal budget seemed to shift. Yes, we still had to worry about public health, but that concern was being stretched by other considerations: business closures, job losses, some ideal of liberty, the desire to eat burritos.</p>
<p>如果社会对风险有预算呢?在某些方面，确实如此。这是**关闭、保持社交距离和就地避难的最初前提。我们共同的感染预算与医院的能力挂钩——ICU病床、呼吸器和能够做出反应的医务人员的数量。对于那些可以在家工作的人来说，他们的任务是尽可能少地贡献总金额。这就给那些做不到的人留下了更多的分数。然后，随着第一条感染曲线开始变平，社会预算的基础似乎发生了变化。是的，我们仍然不得不担心公共健康，但这种担心正被其他的考虑所延伸:企业倒闭、失业、一些自由的理想、想吃墨西哥卷饼的欲望。</p>
<p>As word spread through San Francisco's group-house scene about Ibasho's odd calculator, some people thought that, yes, budgeting seemed a little over the top, and the relentless data entry anxious-making. But people in that community tend to be quantifiers themselves. And for group houses, where each person depended on everyone else for their safety, it also looked like a solution to their own precarity.</p>
<p>当关于伊巴索古怪的服务器的消息在旧金山的团购现场传开时，一些人认为，是的，预算似乎有点过头了，没完没了的数据输入让人焦虑。但这个群体中的人往往是衡量者。对于集体住宅来说，每个人的安全都依赖于其他人，这看起来也像是解决他们自身不稳定的方法。</p>
<p>Josh Oreman</p>
<p>乔什·奥尔曼</p>
<p>Photograph: Gabriela Hasbun</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）</p>
<p>Those group-house friends then started to send the tool to their own friends and family and coworkers. Those second-order contacts responded with gratitude. No official source had produced a tool that answered tangled questions with apparently clear answers. And so new questions were finding their way back to Ibasho: How about the gym? What about kids? Josh Oreman, who had done much of the epidemiological research with Olsson, was concerned about others adopting their model. What if Microcovid inadvertently pushed people toward taking <i>more</i> risk, by giving them a budget that was either too small—and thus ignored—or too great? “What if we say the wrong thing?” he recalls asking. There was only so much that an online risk calculator built for a group of healthy, childless, possibly polyamorous people in their twenties and thirties who lived in a San Francisco group house could do for strangers in unknown situations. There were people who had far less control over their lives than they did—people who worked in an ER or shared a bed with a store clerk.</p>
<p>这些群居的朋友开始把这个工具发送给他们自己的朋友、家人和同事。那些人都对此表示感谢。没有任何官方消息来源提供一种工具，可以用明显明确的答案来回答错综复杂的问题。所以新的问题又回到了伊巴索:健身房怎么样?孩子们怎么样?与奥尔森一起做了大量流行病学研究的乔希·奥尔曼(Josh Oreman)担心其他人会采用他们的模型。 <br>如果微冠状病毒在不经意间促使人们承担更大的风险，给他们的预算要么太小(因此被忽视)，要么太大呢? “如果我们说错了怎么办?”他回忆道。为一群住在旧金山集体住宅的健康、无子女、可能是多面恋的人建立的在线风险计算器，对未知情况下的陌生人所能做的也就这么多。有些人对自己生活的控制力远不如他们，比如在急诊室工作的人，或者与店员同床的人。</p>
<p>Dobro felt that despite Microcovid's limitations, people outside their pod would benefit from using it. As a doctor, she had noticed two extreme trends among her patients. Some had become agoraphobic. They were cleaning fastidiously and refusing to leave their houses even for necessities. Others were fed up with constraints and began taking too many risks. One of her patients, a man in his twenties, began coming in frequently for Covid tests. It turned out he had been bouncing between different groups of friends and jetting off on vacations, believing the tests a guarantee of safety. Dobro had started bringing up her own budgeting in these situations. She wanted to show him and anyone else how he could have some of the life he wanted while still being safe.</p>
<p>多布罗认为，尽管微新冠病毒有其局限性，但身处病毒舱之外的人们将从使用它中受益。作为一名医生，她注意到她的病人中有两种极端的趋势。有些人已经变得恐旷症。他们一丝不苟地打扫卫生，甚至为了生活必需品也不愿离开家。其他人受够了约束，开始冒太多的风险。她的一名患者是一名20多岁的男子，他开始频繁来医院接受Covid - 19检测。事实证明，他一直在不同的朋友圈子里来回奔波，还乘飞机去度假，认为考试是安全的保证。多布罗已经开始在这些情况下提出她自己的预算。她想让他和其他人知道，他可以在安全的情况下享受他想要的生活。</p>
<p>Olsson could see Dobro's logic. Plenty of people still did not seem to understand how Covid-19 spread, and a tool like this might help them. She wasn't thinking of the anti-maskers with beliefs diametrically opposed to her own—she couldn't touch that situation. But she was thinking of the people still scrubbing their hands raw or living in fear of outdoor masked gatherings. Seeing how various activities compared, or how things like masks helped reduce the point totals, might help them find balance. Experts like Jimenez, who took a look at the tool, agreed. Communicating these beliefs was useful.</p>
<p>奥尔森明白多布罗的逻辑。许多人似乎仍然不明白Covid-19是如何传播的，像这样的工具可能会帮助他们。她并没有想到那些与她的信仰完全相反的反面具者——她无法触及那种情况。但她想到的是那些仍在用手擦破皮肉，或生活在户外戴面具聚会恐惧中的人们。看看不同的活动是如何比较的，或者像面具这样的东西是如何帮助减少积分总数的，可能会帮助他们找到平衡。像希门尼斯这样的专家对这一工具进行了研究，并表示同意。交流这些信念是有用的。</p>
<p>Still, Olsson hadn't intended to step in as a public health authority. It was one thing to pass a spreadsheet around to like-minded friends. They knew how to approach the numbers, and they would happily do battle with her biases and assumptions. But risk communication wasn't her expertise. There were abundant caveats. She believed in the numbers—or, at least, she believed in the things they had decided were important for their equations. But with more strangers using the tool, she couldn't help but wonder if perhaps they had oversimplified. What if they had dismissed important routes of transmission, or included a spurious data point that threw everything out of whack?</p>
<p>尽管如此，奥尔森并没有打算以公共卫生当局的身份介入。把电子表格传递给志同道合的朋友是一回事。他们知道如何接近这些数字，而且他们很乐意与她的偏见和假设作斗争。但风险沟通不是她的专长。 <br>不过她作出了大量的警告。她相信那些数字——或者，至少，她相信那些他们认为对他们的方程很重要的东西。但随着越来越多的陌生人使用这一工具，她不禁怀疑他们是否把它简化了。如果他们已经排除了重要的传播途径，或者包含了一个让一切混乱的虚假数据点，那会怎么样?</p>
<p>One of those strangers was Bob Wachter, the chair of internal medicine at UC San Francisco and a frequent public commentator on all matters Covid-19. As a doctor, Wachter was used to probabilistic thinking—working through a range of uncertain pros and cons and arriving at the least worst decision. But in September, he found himself stymied. He was considering a trip to Florida to visit his father, who was 90 and ailing, possibly for the last time. A colleague who happened to know about Ibasho's budgeting heard about his predicament. Soon Wachter was on Microcovid, inputting the details of his flight.</p>
<p>其中一个陌生人是加州大学旧金山分校(UC San Francisco)内科主任鲍勃·瓦赫特(Bob Wachter)，他经常就Covid-19所有问题发表公开评论。作为一名医生，瓦赫特习惯于概率思维——在一系列不确定的利弊中进行思考，最后做出最不坏的决定。但在9月，他发现自己陷入了困境。他正在考虑去佛罗里达看望他90岁的父亲，这可能是最后一次。一位碰巧知道伊巴索预算的同事听说了他的困境。很快，在飞机上，瓦赫特就染上了微病毒。</p>
<p>According to Microcovid, the risk of this flight was 200 microcovids, equivalent to a one in 5,000 chance of infection. The estimate was rough, he knew; for that matter, it was hard to judge what he thought of that level of risk. But he found it grounding, if intangible. “Everyone has to make about 50 risk decisions a day, and they really do need more practical guidance,” he says. “The CDC isn't offering that.” He wouldn't act on Microcovid's points alone, but it was an input into another cost-benefit question: “If this goes badly and I get infected, and if I infect my parents, will I look back and say that I felt like this was a bad decision?” Wachter says. He decided he wouldn't regret this visit. The decision would be sound, even if the outcome turned out badly. So he flew.</p>
<p>据Microcovid报道，此次飞行的风险为200名微病毒感染者，相当于1 / 5000的感染几率。他知道，这个估计很粗略;就此而言，很难判断他对这种风险水平的看法。但他发现这是一种固有的状态，即使它是无形的。他说:“每个人每天都必须做出大约50个风险决定，他们确实需要更多的实际指导。”疾控中心没有提供这种服务。他不会单独就微病毒感染的观点采取行动，但这是另一个成本效益问题的输入:“如果进展不顺利，我被感染了，如果我感染了我的父母，我回过头来会不会说我觉得这是一个糟糕的决定?”韦希特尔说。他对这次拜访父亲的决定并不后悔。即使结果很糟糕，这个决定还是合理的。所以他坐飞机过去了。</p>
<p>In October, I visited Ibasho. We gathered in the backyard. The space was cramped, but the housemates had recently undertaken projects to make it more homey: sprucing up the plants, redoing the masonry. We sat under a lemon tree drooping with fruit, masked and distanced, and I was the only stranger. They weren't using many points. Much of the time, freedom was simple and involved just stepping outdoors or putting on a better mask. Living with Covid-19 was just living. The calculator had achieved what Olsson had set out to do. They had returned to harmony, in which everyone could exercise their own independence around a common set of beliefs.</p>
<p>10月，我去了伊巴修。我们聚集在后院。房间本来很狭小，但室友们最近做了一些让它更有家的感觉的项目:美化植物，重新装修砖石结构。我们坐在一棵挂满果实的柠檬树下，蒙着面具，隔着一段距离，我是唯一的陌生人。他们没有使用很多道具。很多时候，自由很简单，只需要走到户外或者戴上更好的面具。感染Covid-19只是活着而已。计算器达到了奥尔森的目标。他们已经恢复了和谐，每个人都可以围绕着一套共同的信仰行使自己的独立性。</p>
<p>From left to right, Stephanie Bachar, Nick Breen, Josh Oreman, Sarah Dobro, and Catherine Olsson in front of their home in the Mission District.</p>
<p>从左到右，斯蒂芬妮·巴查尔，尼克·布林，乔什·欧曼，莎拉·多布罗和凯瑟琳·奥尔森站在他们位于教会区的家门前。</p>
<p>Photograph: Gabriela Hasbun</p>
<p>图片来源：加布里埃尔·哈斯本（Gabriela Hasbun）</p>
<p>Beyond this Eden, cases of Covid-19 were spiking again. Society was blowing its budget. The housemates had continued modifying Microcovid. The calculator, <a rel="nofollow noopener" href="http://microcovid.org">gussied up with a website and an interface</a>, now also offered a color-coded risk category based on how much an activity contributed, relatively, to a 10,000-microcovid budget. There was an option to calculate risk using a tenth of Ibasho's budget, for people who felt they were at higher risk, and preset scenarios for things people were asking about, like flights and one-night stands. They had started sorting out what to do about kids. There was always more to do.</p>
<p>在这个伊甸园之外，Covid-19病例再次激增。整个社会都在浪费预算。室友们一直在修改微型新冠。这个计算器用网站和界面装饰了一番，现在还根据一项活动对1万微型新冠预算的相对贡献，提供了一个彩色编码的风险类别。对于那些认为自己面临更高风险的人，可以选择使用伊巴索预算的十分之一来计算风险，也可以为人们询问的事情预设场景，比如航班和约炮。他们已经开始考虑如何对待孩子了。 总是有更多的事情要做。</p>
<p>A few weeks later, as the winter surge reached San Francisco, I checked back in. Lives at Ibasho were getting more complicated. The housemates felt they knew how to live, and yet the rising infection rate meant their summer habits were putting them over budget in winter. There were new questions too, like whether a new variant believed to spread faster would mess with their calculations, and how to figure in the risks of people around them who had received a vaccine.</p>
<p>几周后，当冬季的巨浪到达旧金山时，我又回到了这里。伊巴索的生活越来越复杂。室友们觉得他们知道如何生活，然而不断上升的感染率意味着他们夏天的习惯让他们在冬天超出了预算。还有一些新的问题，比如，一种被认为传播速度更快的新变种是否会打乱他们的计算，以及如何计算他们周围接受过疫苗的人的风险。</p>
<p>Bachar had initially found the points frustrating. When the rate of infection had been lower, it had been both overwhelming to keep track of everything—who else was in the line at Walgreens that day, what kinds of masks they wore—and also a little futile, because she never hit her limit anyway. The tabulations didn't come naturally to her as they did to Olsson. But now she found the process oddly comforting. She could see how being around friends who did not budget their risk was getting more expensive. It was odd to think of her friends as “expensive.” She did not like the sound of it, and she would have to see them less. Still, the points gave her a structure. It was a way of coping, however imperfectly, with this strange new life she was living. It was, she had calculated, the best she could do.</p>
<p>巴哈尔最初发现这些分数令人沮丧。在感染率较低的时候，要记录下所有的事情——那天还有谁在沃尔格林排队，他们戴的是什么口罩——是一件非常困难的事情，而且也有点徒劳，因为她从来没有达到自己的极限。她不像奥尔森那样能很自然地接受这些表格。但现在，她发现这个过程让她感到奇怪的安慰。她可以看出，和那些不预算风险的朋友在一起的代价越来越大。想到她的朋友都很“贵重”，感觉很奇怪。她不喜欢这个声音，而且她就得少和他们见面了。尽管如此，这些分数还是给了她一个结构。这是一种应对她所过的陌生新生活的方式，尽管这种方式并不完美。她计算过，这是她所能做的最好的了。</p>